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COMMENTS
LABOR RELATIONS -FREE SPEECH FOR WHOM?
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
Congress from enacting any law which abridges the freedom of speech.1
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has held that the right of
free speech is an absolute one, and that a prior restraint may not be made in
the absence of a "clear and present danger."2  The speaker may, however,
find himself liable, civilly or criminally, for the consequences of his utter-
ance,3 as, for example, when his statement is slanderous, 4 offensive, 5 treason-
ous, 6 or prejudicial to military securitvy.
7
A relatively new branch of the law of free speech has been created by
the expansion of Labor Law into a major legal battleground.8 This branch
is concerned with the limitations which either the courts or the legislature
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances."
2. The "clear and present danger" doctrine was enunciated by Justice Holmes
in the famous case, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), in the following
language:
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theater, and causing a panic . . . .The question
in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
3. The Florida Constitution specifically provides that the speaker shall be liable
for the abuse of his free speech right. See note 119 infra.
4. Beanharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Anderson v. Hearst Publishing
Co., 120 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Emde v. San Joaquin County Central Labor
Council, 132 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1942).
5. Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note 4; State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.I. 310,
18 A.2d 754 (1941); People on complaint of Gould v, Vogt, 178 Misc. 446, 34 N.Y.S.2d
968 (1942).
6. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919); Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943) cert. denied,
320 U.S. 790 (1943),
7. Dennis v. United States. 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Gilbert v. Minnesota, supra
note 6; United States v. Pierce, 252 U.S. 239 (1919); Abrams v. United States, su/ra
note 6; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. -17 (1919); Hickson v. United States, 258
Fed. 867 (4th Cir. 1919); Fraina v. United States, 255 Fed. 28 (2d Cir. 1918).
8. This statement hardly needs support, but it is interesting to compare the
approximate number of pages in successive issues of the Decennial Digests devoted to
labor problems. The Third Decennial (1916 to 1926) had 18 pages, compared with
32 pages in the Fourth Decennial, and 104 pages in the Fifth Decennial. The topic
Labor Relations was not listed as such until 1952 in volume 15 of the General Digest.
In addition to the continually increasing case law, we must not overlook the numerous
state and federal acts which have been passed during the past twenty-five years, nor
the prodigious bulk of Administrative Law which has evolved during this period.
9. For examples of legislative controls upon labor controversies which were
held violative of the constitutional guarantee of free speech, see Carlson v. People, 310
U.S. 106 (1939); People v. Gidaly, 93 P.2d 660 (Cal. 1939); People v. Harris, 104
Colo. 386, 91 P.2d 989 (1939).
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may impose upon the free speech of the parties to a labor dispute. Possibly
because such disputes have led to utterances of the most reprehensible sort, 10
Congress, acting through the National Labor Relations Board, has, in effect,
placed prior restraints on the speech of the parties through the use of its
"cease and desist" orders.
It is the purpose of this comment to analyze and evaluate the changing
trends in this field of law, with particular emphasis on the free speech
rights of employers.
HISTORICAL
Until the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935,
(hereinafter referred to as the Wagner Act) the rights of both employees
and employers in labor disputes were determined almost exclusively by state
law." At least one case under the Railway Labor Act 2 may be found in
which the issue of free speech was determined, 18 and several cases 14 appear
under the ill-fated National Recovery Act.15
The Wagner Act brought about a forceful codification of a labor "Bill
of Rights", guaranteeing for the first time many of the rights and privileges
for which labor unions had long agitated,' While the scope of the Act was
10. Many cases may be found in which either an employer or union agitators
have resorted to threats of physical violence, extortion, loss of employment, damage
to property, etc. While such threats may give rise to an ordinary tort action, they
have become a problem peculiar to labor law, and are most frequently handled as such.
See Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowrnoor Dairies Inc., 312 U.S.
287 (1941); American Steel Industries v. Tri-City General Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184 (1921); N.L.R.B. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL, 216
F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1954); N.L.R.B. v. Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union,
210 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1954); Pacific American Shipowners Ass'n, 98 N.L.R.B. 582
(1952); Tiny 'own Togs, 7 N.L.R.B. 54 (1938); Mitnick v. Furniture Workers
Union, 124 N.J. Eq. 147, 200 Atl. 553 (1938); Busch Jewelry Inc., v. United Retail
Employees Union, 281 N.Y. 150, 22 N.E.2d 320 (1939).
11. Eg., I.B. Rosenthal-Ettlinger Co. v. Schlossberg, 149 Misc. 210, 266 N.Y.S.
762 (1933) (employer may not induce employees to resign from unions by threats,
false statements, or intimidation); Esco Operating Corporating Corp. v. Kaplan, 144
Misc. 646, 258 N.Y.S. 303 (1932) (picketing may be enjoined if misleading signs,
false statements, or veiled threats are used).
12. 44 SrAr. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1952).
13. E.g., Texas and New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship
Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 568 (1930), in which the Supreme Court interpreted the Railway
Labor Act (44 STAT. 577, 45 U.S.C. § 152) which provided ". . . representatives
shall be designated without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by either
party .... " The Court remarked that this clause was "not to be taken as interdicting
the normal communications which are a part of all friendly intercourse, albeit between
employer and employee."
14. Fryus v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co., 114 Nij. Eq. 462, 168 Atl. 862 (1933)
(employer violated National Recovery Act §§ 4(a), 7(a) by coercing employees to
join one union rather than another) Fine Rough Hat Co., 1 N.L.R.B. Case No. 361
(1935); Berger Manufacturing Co., 1 N.L.R.B. Case No. 349 (1935); Proctor and
Gamble Co., 1 N.L.R.B. Case No. 221 (1935); Shuter Gaio Co., 1 N.L.R.B. Case
No. 207 (1934); Globe Gabbe Co., I N.L.R.B. Case No. 206 (1934).
15. 48 STAT. 195 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 701 (1934).
16. For example, legal recognition of a particular union as the exclusive bargaining
representative for the workers (Section 9(a)), the right to form a closed shop
(Section 8(3)), prohibition of certain kinds of employer discrimination and coercion
(Sections 7 and 8), plus the establishment of elaborate administrative machinery for
the settlement of labor disputes (Sections 10 and 11).
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constitutionally limited by the commerce clause, 17 its coverage became
extremely broad as a result of the Supreme Court's liberal construction of the
"affecting commerce" doctrine.'
The specific clause in the Wagner Act which raised the issue of employer
free speech was Section 8(1), prohibiting the employer from interfering
with, or coercing his employees in their right of self-organization. The
newly-foundecd National Labor Relations Board, armed with this clause,
quickly held unfair any express threats or promises of benefit on the part of
the employer, whether or not accompanied by action.' 9 Furthermore, under
the rationale that the employer utterances might carry an implied threat
to those who are potential victims of his economic power, in a series of
rulings, the National Labor Relations Board struck down as unfair virtually
every statement made by an employer on the subject of organized labor,
no matter how innocuous or moderately phrascd.20
Perhaps the philosophy of the Board at that time was best summed up
in the words of Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking in International Association
of Machinists v. N.L.R.B.21
For slight suggestions as to the employer's choice between unions
may have telling effect among men who know the consequences
of incurring that employer's strong displeasure.
22
In 1944, the United States Supreme Court, though strongly liberal in
its economic philosophy, perhaps recognized the lengths to which this
"implied threat" doctrine had been carried, and in Thomas v. Collins2 3
stated, by way of dicta:
Accordingly, decision here has recognized that employer's attempts
to persuade to action with respect to joining or not joining unions
are within the First Amendment guaranty.
2
17. U.S, CONST. Art. 1, § 8.
18. N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939); Santa Crnz Fruit Packing
Company v. N.L.R.B., 303 U.S. 453 (1938); N.L.R.B. v. Friedman-larry Marks
Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); N L.R.B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49
(1937); N.L.R.B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
19. National Casket Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 963 (1936); Smith Cabinet & Mfg. Co.,
I N.L.R.B. 950 (1936); Brown Shoe Co., I N.L.R.B. 803 (1936); Washington, Vir-
ginia, and Maryland Coal Co., 1 N.L.R.B, 769 (1936); Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing
Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 411 (1936); The Timken Silent Automatic Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 335
(1936).
20. Colombia Enameling & Stamping Co., 1 N.L R.B. 181 (1936); Ingram
Mfg. Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 908 (1938). Hoover Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 688 (1938); Proximity
Print Works, 7 N.L R.B. 803 (1938); Virginia Ferry Co. v. N.L.R.B., 8 N.L.R.B.
730 (1938), order enforced, 101 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1939); Picker X-ray Corp., 12
N.L.R.B. 1384 (1939); Oregon Worsted Co., 14 N.L.R]B. 37 (1938); Steward Die
Casting Co., 14 N.L.R.B. 113 (1939); Maryland Nut and Bolt Co., 14 N.L.R.B. 707
(1939); Wickwire Brothers, 16 N.L.R.B. 316 (1939): Rockford Mitten and Hosiery
Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 501 (1939); Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 30 N.L.R.B. 1093 (1941);
Germain Seed and Plant Co., 37 N.L.R.B. 1090 (1941); Columbian Powder Co.,
40 N.L.R.B. 227 (1942); Sport Wear Hosiery Mills, 41 N.L.R.B. 668 (1942).
21. 311 U.S. 72 (1940).
22. Id. at 78.
23. 323 U.S. 516 (1944). See also the remarks of L. Hand, J., in N.L.R.B. v.
Federbush Company, 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941).
24. 323 U.S. at 527.
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A square holding to this effect may be found in N.L.R.B. v. American
Tube Bending Co.,25 a case which, however, along with the Thomas case,
seemingly wielded little influence upon subsequent Board rulings. In the
words of the Senate Committee on Public Welfare: 2
The Board has placed a limited construction upon these decisions
by holding such speeches by employers to be coercive if the em-
ployer was found guilty of some other unfair labor practice, even
though severable or unrelated . . . or if the speech was made in
the plant on working time .... The Committee believes these
decisions are too restrictive .27
The framers of the Labor-Management Relations Act,28 (hereinafter
referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act) under the guidance of the late
Senator Robert A. 'raft, sought, by legislative fiat, to correct the constitu-
tionally and morally questionable rulings of the National Labor Relations
Board in this area, which apparently were otherwise to remain immune
from judicial review. Accordingly, Section 8(c) 20 was incorporated into
the new Act, guaranteeing to each side freedom to express its views if no
threat of reprisal or promise of benefit be made. This section has since
been construed in a number of Board rulings and court decisions with
the overall effect of restoring, to a great measure at least, the benefits
of the First Amendment to employers. "
We shall now discuss the specific problems which arise when the
employer or the employees make pro- or anti-union utterances, and the
extent to which such activities are constitutionally protected.
ThE EMPLOYER'S PREMISES AS A FORUm
FOR PRO- OR ANTI-UNION ACTIVITIES
The landmark case upholding the right of a labor union to solicit
employees on the employer's property is Republic Aviation Company v.
N.L.R.B.,at where it was held that an employer could not prohibit such
activity, even though it did not appear that the union would have no other
25. 134 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1943).
26. Senate Report No. 105, 80th Congress, 1st Session, p. 23.
27. The Committee referred to Monumental Life InsUtrance Company (69 N.L.R.B.
247 (1946) in which the "totality of conduct" doctrine was applied regarding employer
utterances. See p. 46 infra for a further discussion of this doctrine.
28. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.SC. §§ 141-188 (1952).
29. "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or beevidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or promise of benefit."
30. N.L.R.B. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 214 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954); Indiana
Metal Products Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 202 1R2d 613 (7th Cir, 1953); N.L.R.B. v. Ray
Smith Transportation Corp., 193 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1951); Pittsburgh Steamship Co.
v. N.L.R.B. 180 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950); N.L.R.B. v. O'Keefe & Merritt Mfg. Co.,
178 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1949); National Furniture Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.13. 228 (1953);Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 100 N.L.R.B. 689 (1952); Crowley's Milk Co., 88N.L.R.B. 1049 (1950); United Aircraft Corp., 85 N.L.R.B. 183 (1949); Macon Textiles,
80 N.L.R.B. 1525 (1948).
31. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
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opportunity to contact the workers. 2  This decision has been followed
without substantial modification even after the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act. The only significant limitation to the Republic holding has
been May Department Stores,33 a prc-Taft-Hartley decision which held
that the management of a retail store could properly prohibit union
solicitation on its selling floors. The decision was made on a purely practical
basis, namely, that a chaotic condition might result in the store if union
solicitors and customers were each to compete for the attention of the sales
clerks.34
While the right of employees and union representatives to use the
employer's premises as a forum seems fairly well settled, not so is the
right of the employer to use his own premises for that purpose. If the
employer attempts to express his views on the question of unionization, he
will find himself sharply limited by the rules which have been established
by the National Labor Relations Board and by the courts regarding
coercive utterances. 35 These will be discussed later. Furthermore, if he
decides to air his views orally during working hours (rather than via the
plant bulletin board, or by leaflet distribution) he will run headlong into
an additional legal entanglement known as the captive audience doctrine.
The captive audience doctrine was enunciated in Clark Brothers,6
a leading pre-Taft-Hartley decision, which, as might be expected, held that
it was unfair for an employer to exercise the control of his employees
during working hours for the purpose of delivering an anti-union speech.
The Board disregarded the fact that the employees were actually free to
leave if they did not care to hear the speech,37 (and were undoubtedly less
"captive" than if they were listening to a pro-union speech at the union
hall, under the surveillance of union agitators).
32. The Court quoted, witi approval, the following excerpts from the Board's
ruling( 51 N.L.R.B. 1186, 1195):
The respondent's employees . were entirely deprived of their normal
right to 'full freedom of association' in the plant on their own time, the very
time and place uniquely appropriate and almost solely available ....
Inconvenience or even some dislocation of property rights, may be necessary
to safeguard the right to collective bargaining.
33. 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946), affirming with modifications May Department
Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944).
34. ". . . the solicitation if carried on on the selling floor, where customers are
normally present, might conceivably be disruptive of the respondent's business." (59
N.L.R.B. at 981).
35. In spite of the enactment of Section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act, the
employer must still be careful not to step into the prohibited area of coercion-an area
by no means clearly defined. See and compare N.L.R.B. v. Protein Blenders, 215 F.2d
749 (8th Cir. 1954); N.L.R.B. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 209 F.2d 593 (2d Cir.
1954); N.L.R.B. v. Ray Smith Transport Co., supra note 30; N.L.R.B. v. O'Keefe &
Merritt Mfg. Co., supra note 30; N.L.R.B. v. West Ohio Gas Co., 172 F.2d 685 (8th
Cir. 1949). Protein Blenders, 105 N.L.R.B. 890 (1953); Cary Lumber Co., 102 N.L.R.B.
406 (1953S; Farmers Cooperative Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 144 (1953); Coming Class Works,
100 N.L.R.B. 444 (1952); Long-Lewis Hardware Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1403 (1950).
36. 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947), enforcing, 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946).
37. Even though the workers were being paid to listen to the anti-union speech,
it is nowhere suggested in the Board's opinion that the employees were actually restrained.
See 70 N.L.R.B. at 804.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
After the Taft-Hartley Act went into effect, Clark Brothers was
expressly repudiated in Babcock and Wilcox,3a a 1948 ruling. The Board
concluded that the new section, 8(c), gave the employer the right to
address his employees concerning labor problems, regardless of the time
or place. This interpretation of section 8(c) was reaffirmed in S 6 S
Corrugated Paper Machinery Co., Inc.3 on essentially the same facts.
However, in 1951, the National Labor Relations Board reversed itself again,
by overruling Babcock & Wilcox in the famous Bonwit Teller" case, and
was upheld by United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.4'
Because of its significance, the Bonwit Teller case merits fuller discussion
at this point.
Bonwit Teller, a well-known New York retail store, enforced a rule
which prohibited union solicitation on its selling floors during working
hours. It will be recalled that, under the May Department Stores de-
cision,42 such a "no-solicitation" rule is valid. A management representative
of Bonwit Teller made a so-called "captive audience" speech to the em-
ployees during working hours, and then refused to provide equal time
during working hours for a union rebuttal. The Board held that the
employer's speech was coercive, but this finding was set aside by the
court. The significant part of the decision lies in its holding that, where
a no-solicitation rule was in effect, it was unfair for the employer not "to
abstain from campaigning on the same premises to which the union was
denied access '." 43 Swan, J., dissented on the grounds that the act contains
no suggestion that a similar opportunity must be accorded the union
whenever the employer exercises his free speech privilege guaranteed by
section 8(c).44
In 1953, a similar situation arose in N.L.R.B. v. American Tube
Bending Company,45 (note that this is not the same case referred to in
note 25) where the employer made an anti-union speech during working
hours, and at the same time imposed a no-solicitation rule during both
working and non-working hours. The court struck down the no-solicitation
rule on the authority of the Republic decision,4 ' and went on to hold that
the employer's speech, made while such a rule was in force, constituted
38. 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948). Compare Merry Brothers Tile & Brick Co., 75
N.L.R.B. 136 (1947) which ruled that a captive audience speech would be unlawful
if a similar opportunity were not afforded the union organizers,
39. 89 N.L.RB. 1363 (1950).
40. Bonwit Teller Inc., 96 N L.R.B. 608 (1951), order enforced with modifica-
tions, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953).
41. The majority opinion in this case was written by Augustus J. Hand, J.
42. See note 30 supra, and the related text.
43. 197 F.2d at 645.
44. Id. at 646.
45. 205 F,2d 45 (2d Cir. 1953) affilrming American rube Bending Co., 102
N.L.R.B. 735 (1953).
46. See note 31 supra.
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an "added unfair practice." 47  An important distinction between this case
and Bonwit Teller, of course, is that here the employer had been enforcing
the no-solicitation rule at all times, rather than just during working hours.
To further unsettle this entire aspect of the free speech problem, a
recent (1954) decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, N.L.R.B. v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,48 has added another overruling
to the above sequence of overrulings by overruling Bonwit Teller. The facts
of the Woolworth case were practically identical to those in Bonwit Teller;
Woolworth is also a retail store, a no-solicitation rule was in effect, and
the employer, after making a "captive audience" speech, refused to accede
to the union's demand for equal time during working hours to deliver a
pro-union speech. The union charged the company with committing
an unfair labor practice, and secured a restraining order from the National
Labor Relations Board. On petition for enforcement, the Court of Appeals
held that the employer's conduct was protected by section 8(c), and the
petition was denied, McAllister, J., dissenting.
The majority opinion in the Woolworth case, after reviewing the facts
and the contentions of each side, gave a brief history of free speech in
the field of labor law, citing, among others, the Clark, Babcock and Wilcox,
and Bonwit Teller decisions. The Bonwit Teller case, of course, represented
a big hurdle to be overcome, and while we 'nay or may not agree with
the Woolworth decision, it does seem to be built on somewhat shaky
ground. The opinion appears weak in that it attempts to distinguish
the Bonwit Teller case on its facts, but for good measure squarely repudiates
its holding anyway-unnecessarily, of course, if the distinction were really
valid. The factual distinction made was that the employer's speech in
the Bonwit case was supposedly coercive, unlike that made by the Wool-
worth employer."' This distinction falls down when we recall that in the
Bonwit Teller case, the Board's finding of coercion was expressly rejected
by the Court of Appeals °0
A good portion of the majority opinion is devoted to a consideration
of the many arguments of authorities offered by the Board in its brief.51
hIle court had little difficulty in disposing of these since, with the exception
of Bonwit Teller, none of the Board's cases was too closely on point, and
47. 205 F.2d at 46.
48. 214 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954). Noted in 29 TUL. L. Rev. 359 (1955).
49. Id. at 81.
50. "The conclusion of the Board that the speeches [of the employer] involved
promises of benefit or threats or reprisal seems to us to have been erroneous."
(197 F.2d at 644).
51. The Board argued that the address of the Woolworth store manager"removed all doubt concerning the employer's position on the question of representation."
Also, that the employer violated his own no-solicitation rule by conferring with his
employees about their proposed unionization, and that the adequacy of the facilities
available to the union was immaterial. The weakness in each of these contentions made
was clear by Judge Allen who pointed out that the whole purpose of section 8(c) would
be defeated by the Board's interpretation, and that no case law could be found to support
the Board's arguments.
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many were pre-Taft-l-Iartlcy decisions. 2' ' The Board at one point even
went so far afield as to rely on a provision in the Federal Communications
Act 53 which provides that broadcasting stations must provide equal air
time to opposing political candidates. 4  The court dismissed this question-
able analogy in fittingly few words.",
From the standpoint of logic, rather than authority, however, the
majority opinion is more convincing. It pointed out that the whole
purpose of section 8(c) would be frustrated if the employer, on exercising
his newly-affirmed freedom of speech, were forced to turn over his own
facilities to have his words promptly contradicted. This particular union,
it was noted, had adequate facilities and opportunities for contacting the
employees, both while they were entering and leaving the employer's
premises, and in the nearby union hall, one and one-half blocks away.
A contrary holding, the court decided, would impair the employer's con-
stitutional and statutory right of free speech.
Judge Miller's concurring opinion expressed an interesting and basically
sound viewpoint. He conceded that the employer's action was discrimina-
tory as to the union, but he did not believe that it should be considered
unfair, any more than should a refusal on the part of the union to provide
equal time for the employer to speak at its union hall.' Rather, he
reasoned, such conduct should be regarded as part of the permissible
area of discriminatory action recognized by society as the inevitable con-
comitant of conflicting social and economic interests.5 7 Judge Miller
quoted with approval the following rather pungent passage from Living-
stone Shirt Corp.:58
the Board resuscitated the time-honored "economic power" argument in its attempt
to prove that its ruling was justified on the basis of the superior economic power of
the employer compared to that of the workers. Judge Allen made the following
heartening remark (214 F.2d at 83):
Freedom of speech is guaranteed under the Constitution alike to the weak
and the powerful. The Board is not authorized by construction and implication
to limit the freedom of speech established in the Constitution and re-emphasized
in Section 8(c).
Tbe petition for enforcement is denied.
52. E.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793 (1945); International
Association of Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 72 (1940); N.L.R.B. v. Waterlan
Steamship Corporation, 309 U.S. 206 (1939). The court called attention in its opinion
to the defunct nature of the Board's authorities (214 F.2d at 82).
53. 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 8-609 (1952).
54. 48 STAT. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1952).
55. "This analogy is not pertinent." (214 F.2d at 79).
56. 214 F.2d at 83.
57. Judge Miller remarked as follows (214 F.2d at 83):
Conceding the finding that respondent [employer] discrininatorily applied its
rule prohibiting union activity on its premises to be correct, I do not think
it follows that respondent thereby violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act ....
In any contest between management and labor, each side uses the facilities
which are available to it, and nothing in the Act calls for a sharing of those
facilities or resources with the other .... The Act recognizes certain permissible
anti-union activities, such as those included in Sec. 8(c).
58. 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
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...we do not think one party must be so strangely open-hearted
as to underwrite the campaign of the other . .. .It [equality of
opportunity] is not to le realistically achieved by attempting, as
was done in the Bonwit Teller case, to make the facilities of one
available to the other.
The dissenting opinion of Judge McAllister relies, with one exception,
(the Bonwit Teller case) on Wagner Act vintage decisions,59 which seem
fatally defective when invoked in the Taft-Hartley era. However, quite
apart from the defunct authority cited, the dissent seems weak in that
it is devoted almost entirely to the reiteration of one argument, namely
that it is unfair for the employer to speak during working hours, while
the union is forbidden to do so.60
Two recent National- Labor Relations Board rulings have been issued
since the hearing in the Woolworth case, (though prior to the date of
the Woolworth decision) which are of further interest. Livingstone Shirt
Corp., 1 anticipated the Woolworth decision by a few months, and, on
essentially the same facts, held that no unfair labor practice had taken
place. The Board expressly rejected the Bonwit Teller doctrine, and upheld
the employer's conduct "in the absence of either an unlawful broad no-
solicitation rule (prohibiting union access to the [employer's] premises
on other than working time) or a privileged no-solicitation rule (broad, but
not unlawful because of the character of the business)." 62  Peerless Ply-
wood,63 a decision issued on the same day as Livingstone Shirt Corp.,
differs factually from the Livingstone Shirt case in that no no-solicitation
rule was in effect, and that the employer's speech was delivered a few
hours prior to a representation election. The Board set the election aside,
and in doing so, announced a new rule. Henceforth, said the Board, no
speeches may be made on company time to massed assemblies of employees
during the twenty-four hour period immediately preceding a representation
election0 4 This rule is to be applied with equal force to employers and
employees.
AN ANALYSIS OF BOARD RULINGS AND COURT DECISIONS
ON VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 8(e).
a) By the Employer.
Section 8(c), the free speech clause of the Taft-Hartley Act, and
section 8(a), the employer unfair labor practice clause, complement each
59. E.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Republic Aviation Corp. v.
N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793 (1945); International Association of Machinists v. N.L.R.B.,
311 U.S. 72 (1940); N.L.R.B. v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir.
1948); N.L.R.B. v. American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1946).
60. The dissent cited, with approval, 61 YALE L.J. 1066 (1952), which pointed
out the possible hardship toward the workers in denying them the employer's facilities
for pro-union activities.
61. 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
62. 107 N.L.R.B. at 409.
63. 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
64. 107 N.L.R.B. at 429.
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other and must be considered together in analyzing employer free speech
problems. That is to say, an expression of opinion by the employer which
is coercive or which contains a threat of reprisal or promise of benefit
not only fails to come within the protection of section 8(c), but in
addition violates 8(a) and may be considered an unfair labor practice.
Conversely, an expression which may have the effect of interfering, re-
straining, or coercing the employees in their right of self-organization,
violates the interdiction of section 8(a), and further more, cannot be
justified as a "privileged" utterance under section 8(c). An added com-
plication has been introduced by the Peerless Plywood case,65 which intro-
duced the 24-hour pre-election speech ban. Under the rule announced in
this case, section 8(c) may not be used to justify utterances made within
the 24-hour period, but such utterances do not per se constitute an unfair
labor practice. Rather, the effect of speech-making on company time
within the prohibited period is merely to void the results of the representa-
tion election.6 An analagous theory was announced in Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co.,"7 and General Shoe Corporation,5 where it was held that
an election might be set aside if the employer's utterances were such as
to pieclude the possibility of a fair election, even though the utterance
could not be declared unfair under section 8(c).
Prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, an important limita-
tion on employer utterances was the so-called totality of conduct doctrine,
introduced by the famous case N.L.R.B. v. Virginia Electric 6 Power
Comrpany,69 which still exists today in a somewhat watered-down form.
Under this doctrine, an employer utterance, even though not coercive when
viewed by itself, might be considered coercive in view of the employer's
"total conduct."70  The doctrine was applied in subsequent Board rulings
with a harshness71 that later became the subject of severe Congressional
65. Ibid.
66. Sparkletts Drinking Water Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 293 (1954).
67. 90 N.L.R.B. 935 (1950).
68. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
69. 314 U.S. 469 (1941), reversing Virginia Electric & Power, 20 N.L.R.B. 911
(1940). On remand (40 N.L.R.B. 297) the Board ruled in accord with its original
ruling, and was affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Virginia Electric
& Power Co. v. N.L.R.B. 132 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1942). The "totality of conduct"
doctrine was expressed most clearly by Justice Murphy in the following words (314
U.S. at 477):
If the total activities of an employer restrain or coerce his employees in their
free choice, then those employees are entitled to the protection of the Act. And
in determining whether a course of conduct amounts to restraint or coercion,
pressure exerted vocally by the employer may no more be disregarded than
pressure in other ways.
70. See note 69 sopra.
71. Monumental Life Insurance Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 247 (1946) and Clark Brothers,
70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946) are examples which drew the particular attention of the Senate
(Senate Report No. 105, 80th Congress, 1st Session, p. 23). Other examples, to name
but a few, are Virginia Electric & Power Co., supra note 69; N.L.R.B. v. Winona Knitting
Mills, 163 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1947); N.L.R.B. v. GaCtke Corporation, 162 F.2d 252
(7th Cir. 1947); N.L.R.B. v. Bird Machine Co, 161 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1947); R.R.
Donnelly & Sons Co., v. N.L.R.B., 156 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1946); Keystone Steel and
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scrutiny,7 2 and eventual legislative reform. The totality of conduct doc-
trine, as such, died with the enactment of section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley
Act.7 4  However, its ghost is still with us in the form of a context rule
which has been applied in several Board rulings and court decisions.75
The rule is to the effect that employer utterances must be studied in their
context to determine whether or not they violate sections 8(a) (1) or 8(c).7 1
If the term "context" were confined to its usual meaning, i.e., the language
preceding or following the disputed utterance, the rule would not be
unusual or even noteworthy. However, the term "context" has been used
in these cases to include conduct7 on the part of the employer. Thus, a
line of cases may be found in which the restrictive totality of conduct
doctrine has been partially revived.78 Fortunately, at least one decision 79
appears to have rejected the new "context" rule, in favor of a stricter
enforcement of the rights guaranteed by section 8(c).
From the multitude of cases and court decisions in which a particular
expression of aii employer was considered, and held to be either privileged
or non-privileged under section 8(c), it is difficult to extract many general
Wire Co., v. N.L.R.B., 155 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1946); American National Bank of
St. Paul v. N.L.R.B., 144 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1944); N.L.R.B. v. Fairmont Creamery
Co., 144 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1944); N.L.R.B. v. Lettie Lee, 140 F.2d 243 (9th Cir.
1944); N.L.R.B. v. John Engelhorn & Sons, 134 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1943).
72. The Conference report, [louse Report 510, 80th Congress, page 45, stated:
"The practice which the Board has had in the past of using speeches and
publications of employers concerning labor organizations and collective bar-
gaining arrangements as evidence, no matter how immaterial or irrelevant,
that some later act of the employer had an illegal purpose gave rise to the
necessity for this change in the law."
73. The enactment of Section 8(c) represented a major reform in the federal labor
legislation in this area.
74. In the words of the court in Pittsburgh Steamship Co., v. N.L.R.B., 180 F.2d
731, 735 (6th Cir. 1950), ". . . Section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act was specifically
intended to prevent the Board from using unrelated non-coercive expressions of opinion
on union matters as evidence of a general course of unfair labor conduct." See also
Mylan-Sparta Co., Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1948); Tygart Sportswear Co., 77 N.LR.B.
613 (1948).
75. N.L.R.B. v. Protein Blenders, 215 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1954); N.L.R.B. v.
Kropp Forge Co., 178 F2d 822 (7th Cir. 1949); N.L.R.B. v. O'Keefe and Merritt Mfg.
Co., 178 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1949) (". . . we realize the words are not to be
looked at in a vacuum, but in the light of all the circumstances surrounding their
utterance."); N.L.R.B. v. Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills, 175 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1949);
N.L.R.B. v. Vest Ohio Gas Co., 172 F.2d 685 (1949) (dicta); Cary Lumber Co.,
102 N.L.R.B. 406 (1953); Superior Coach Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 87 (1953); Parker
Brothers & Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 872 (1952); Apex Toledo Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 807 (1952);
Corning Glass Works, 100 N.L.R.B. 444 (1952).
76, N.L.R.B. v. Protein Blenders, supra note 75, at page 750, "... if the
setting, the conditions, the methods, the incidents, the purpose, or other probative
context of the particular situation can be appraised, in reasonable probability, as having
had the effect of restraining or coercing the employees." Cary Lumber Co., supra
note 75, was decided upon ". . . the context of the statements, and the position of the
speaker in relation to his audience-factors which [the] Board has regarded as significant
in determining whether statement is free of any threat of reprisal or promise of benefit."
(102 N.L.R.B. at 409). Also see the other cases cited in note 75 supra.
77. Ibid.
78. See note 75 supra.
79. N.L.R.B. v. Coming Glass Works, 204 F.2d 422 (1st Cir. 1953).
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rules. Often, the cases turn on claboratc findings of fact 0 and probably
represent unique holdings which are not likely to be duplicated.
The following rulings seem to be of particular interest. A single
threat or coercive statement by the employer will not constitute a violation
of the Act.81  Apparently the de minimus doctrine was the basis for this
line of authority. 2  A "back-to-work" appeal which contains no threat
of reprisal or promise of benefit is privileged under section 8(c), 3 but the
National Labor Relations Board seems to apply a rather strict standard
of conduct in such cases, and is inclined to resolve any doubt against the
employer.84  Questioning of the employees about their union membership
or their pro-union activities was a violation of the Acts5 until 1954 when
the Board held in Blue Flash Express86 that such interrogation was not
per se unlawful. A recent ruling, Graber Manufacturing Company,87
limited the Blue Flash holding by declaring that the employer's inquiries
must be confined to information about the strength of the union in the
plant, and not be directed to information about the pro-union activities
of individual employees or activities of the union leaders. This view is
in conformity with the pre-Blue Flash cases, Dixie Terminal Company,"8
and N.L.R.B. v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company. 9 It
further appears that the employer must be careful to avoid repeated interro-
gations which might be construed as intimidation or coercion of the em-
ployees. 1  A statement by the employer that, even if the union is
certified, he will never bargain with it has been held not within the pro-
tection of section 8(c),9 ' though it is difficult to see how such a statement
80. E.g., Cary Lumber Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 406 (1953); Holme & Seifert, 102
N.L.R.B. 347 (1953).
SL N.L.R.B. v. Borchert, 188 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1951); Commercial Printing
Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 469 (1952); Boston & Lockport Block Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 686 (1952);
Peerless Woolen Mills, 86 N.L.R.B. 82 (1949); lewgley. d.b.a. Louisville Title Agency,
85 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1949); Sunray Oil Corp., 82 N.L.R.B. 942 (1949); Rice-Stix of
Arkansas, 79 N.L.R.B. 1333 (1948); Coldblatt Bros., 77 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1948).
82. See Coldblatt Bros., note 81 supra, at 1264.
83. Rugin Bros. Footwear v. N.L.R.B., 203 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1953); Jordan
Bus Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 148 (1954); Administrative Decision of N.L.R.B. General
Counsel, Case No. 892 (1954).
84. Efco Mfg., 108 N.L.R.B. 52 (1954); Cincinnati Steel Casting Co., 86 N.L.R.B.
592 (1949); Cathey Lumber Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 157 (1949); Samuel Bingham Sons
Mfg. Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1612 (1948).
85. Such questioning was ruled unlawful per se in Waterman Industries Inc.,
91 N.L.R.B. 1041 (1950); Atlanta Broadcasting Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 808 (1950); Standard-
Coosa-Thatcher, 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949). The Sixteenth Annual Report, N.L.R.B.,
(1951), placed questions about the following topics within the prohibited category:
, I . employees' union membership and activities. Their attitude toward
the union, or their desire for union representation. Their voting intentions
in a scheduled Board election. \Vhcther they had received solicitation letters
from a union."
86. 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954).
87. 111 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (1955).
88. 102 N.L.R.B. 1452 (1953).
89. 179 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1950).
90. A. L. Gilbert Co., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 231 (1954).
91. Lima Electric Products, 104 N.L.R.B. 344 (1953); F. W. Woolworth Co.,
101 N.L.R.B. 1457 (1952).
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could be considered coercive. However, the employer's statement that the
union can "get you nowhere until negotiations are completed and a
contract signed" was held not in violation of the Act.02 Employers must
also be careful in stating predictions about the future results of unioniza-
tion. In one case 9 a prediction by the employer that if the union were
successful working hours would be reduced was considered a "threat" of
loss of pay, without regard to the accuracy of such a prediction. Opposed
to this holding, however, is A. L. Gilbert Co.,94 in which the Board ruled
that such a statement was merely a prediction, and drew particular attention
to the fact that any reduction in working hours would be brought about
by the union rather than by management. In contrast with the above, a
statement by the employer that the employees were free to leave whenever
they wished, since he could replace them at any time, and that if the
employees destroyed their jobs by unionization, it would be their own
fault, was ruled not to "contain any threat of reprisal or promise of
benefit. '" 15  Circulation of anti-union petitions has been held a violation
of section 8(c) " as were statements by the employer which tended to
discredit the certified bargaining representative. 7  Presumably, similar
conduct on the part of the union, however, would not be a violation. 8
Statements by the employer that he preferred individual bargaining to
collective bargaining, " or that he preferred one union to another'00 have
been held privileged under section 8(c).
b) By Labor Organizations.
One of the most significant reforms brought about by the Taft-Hartcy
Act was to create, for the first time, a legal responsibility on the part of
92. Mike Persia Chevrolet Co., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 82 (1953). Accord, Evans &
Sons, 81 N.L.R.B. 161 (1949).
93. N.L.R.B. v. McCatron, 216 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1954). Accord, N.L.R.B.
v. Beatrice Foods Co., 183 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1950); N.L.R.B. v. J. S. Abercrombie
Co., 180 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1950); Jefferson Co., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 113 (1954);
Alma Piston Co., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 51 (1954); Farmer's Cooperative Co., 102 N.L.R.B.
144 (1953); Westinghouse Pacific Coast Brake Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 145 (1950); Goodall
Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 814 (1949).
94. 110 N.L.R.B. No. 231 (1954). Accord, Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B.
106 (1953); Sylvania Electric Products, 106 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1953); Agar Packing and
Provision Corp., 81 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1949); Mylan-Sprta Co., Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 1144
(1948).
95. Crowley's Milk Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1049 (1950).
96. Red Rock Co., 187 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1951); Rubin Bros. Footwear, 91 N.L.R.B.
10 (1950); H & 11 Mfg. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1373 (1949); Dixie Culvert Mfg. Co., 87
N.L.R.B. 554 (1949).
97. N.L.R.B. v. Valley Broadcasting Co., 189 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1951); N.L.RB.
v. Union Mfg. Co., 179 F.2d 511 (5th Cii. 1950).
98. Administrative Decision of N.L.R.B. General Counsel, Case No. 971 (1954);
Administrative Decision of N.L.R.B. General Counsel, Case No. 284 (1952).
99. Q-F Wholesalers, 87 N.L.RB. 1085 (1949); Meyer & Welch, 85 N.L.R.B.
706 (1949); L.1. Butcher Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 1184 (1949); tlindc & Danch Paper Co.,
78 N.L.R.B. 488 (1948); Bailey Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 941 (1948).
100. N.L.R.B. v. Corning Glass Works, 204 F.2d 422 (1st Cir. 1953); Sterling
Cabinet Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 6 (1954); Joy Togs, 83 N.L.R.B. 1024 (1949).
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labor unions for their unfair practices. 101 Furthermore, the Act specifically
desginates certain union practices as unlawful, as for example, feather-
bedding,102 the secondary boycott,0 3 refusal to bargain,10' excessive dues
or initiation fees, 10 or the use of restraint or coercion against employees
in their guaranteed right of self-organization. 00
Section 8(c), the free speech clause, must be read in conjunction with
these prohibitions to determine whether or not an utterance by a labor
organization, or by an employee, is unlawful, just as the corresponding
prohibitions against the employer must be so considered' 07  It appears
to be well settled that expressions of opinion which are in furtherance of
an illegal activity are not within the protection of section 8(c). I0 Even
though the Act is a federal law, union activities which violate state laws
also fall within its prohibition. 09  An exception to the foregoing rule
appears if the state law is one which the court or the National Labor
Relations Board feels is in conflict with the provisions of the federal
Act.110 Thus the purpose for which the expression of opinion is made
becomes important when analyzing it under section 8(c), and it is to be
noted that the same act may be held in one ease illegal, and in another
privileged as "free speech" depending on the end to be accomplished."'
In spite of the Act's express prohibition against threats or coercive utter-
ances, the National Labor Relations Board does not seem to regard
abusive language or name-calling, a frequent practice of union organizers,
as coercive, and union organizers are today free to address individuals
101. In addition to designating certain labor union practices as unfair, the Act
sets up administrative process for the prevention of such practices, and makes labor
organizations suable, as an entity, for damage caused by their unlawful acts. See §§
8(b), 8(d) (4), 10(a), 301, 302, 303 and 313 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
102. Taft-lHartley Act, § 8(b) (6).
103. Taft-Hartley Act, § 8(b)(4).
104. Taft-Hartley Act, § 8(b) (3).
105. Taft-Hartley Act, § 8(b) (5).
106. Taft-Hartley Act, § 8(b) (1).
107. See page 45 supra.
108. N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S.
675 (1951); N.L.R.B. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL, 216 F.2d
161 (8th Cir. 1954); NL.R.B. v. Jarka Corp. of Philadelphia, 198 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.
1952); Slater v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 175 F.2d 608 (10th
Cir. 1949); Personal Products Corp., 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954); Fox Midwest Amuse-
ment Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 699 (1952): Pacific American Shipowners Ass'n, 98 N.L.R.B.
582 (1952). Cf., Pure Oil Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 315 (1949).
109. Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Gibonev v.
Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Lincoln Federal Union, AFL v.
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). A pre-Taft-Ilartley case to the
same effect is the famous Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722
(1942). It should be noted here that § 14(b) of the Taft-lartley Act specifically pro-
vides that state law is to govern in determining the legality of closed shop agreements.
110. Garner v. '1'eamsters Local, AFL, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Amalgamated Ass'n
of Street, Electric & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951); International Union, CIO v. O'Brien. 339 U.S. 454 (1950);
Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); Capital Service Inc., v. N.L.R.B., 204 F.2d 848
(9th Cir. 1953); Henderson ex Tel Lee v. Florida. 65 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1953).
Ill. Compare Sperry v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 77 F.
Supp. 321 (1). Colo. 1948) with N.L.R.B. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners, 184 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1950).
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as "scabs," 112 "sons of bitches,""'  and "bastards" 1 14 as they see fit.
Fortunately, such practices are not looked upon favorably by state courts, 115
and are frequently enjoined.
A SUMMARY OF THE FLORIDA LAW
The Florida legislature has acted, not vigorously, to govern the activi-
ties of both employers and labor organizations. 18  If the parties come
within the jurisdiction of the Taft-lartley Act, then the Florida statutes
may or may not also apply depending on their conflict with the federal
law. The problem of the prermption of state laws by federal law is a
study in itself," 7 and is beyond the scope of this article. At least one
section of the Florida statutes has been stricken down as being repugnant
to federal law." 8
As far as free speech is concerned, the Florida legislature has spoken
in two places:" 9
Section 447.09. Franchise. No person shall interfere with or
prevent the right of franchise of any member of a labor organiza-
tion. Such right shall include . . . his right of free petition,
lawful assemblage, and free speech.
Section 447.1 3. All as specifically provided in this chapter, nothing
herein shall be construed . . . as to invade unlawfully the right to
freedom of speech.
In interpreting these sections the Florida Supreme Court has followed
the views of the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts in
upholding injunctions against any communication made in furtherance
of an illegal activity.' 20 While no cases appear in which expressions of
opinion on the part of the employer are directly in issue, the court has
112. E.g., Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948).
113. E.g., International Longshoremen's and Warehouseman's Union, 79 N.L.R.B.
1487 (1948).
114. id. at 1493.
115. Lassiter v. Swift & Co., 204 Ga. 561, 50 S.E.2d 359 (1948); Boyd v. Deena
Artware Inc., 239 S.W.2d 86 (Ky. 1951); Independent Taxi Service v. Teamsters Local,
23 L.R.R.M. 2138 (Pa. Cm. Pis. 1948); McWhorter v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 857,
63 S.E.2d 20 (1951).
116. FLA. STAT. §§ 447.01 to 447.15 (1953).
117. SEE FORKOSCir, A TIREATIS ON LABOR LAw § 205 (1st ed. 1953); Smith,
Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction, 46 Micn. L. REv. 593 (1948); Note, 3 BuF'.
L. REV. 326 (1954).
118. In Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945), §§ 447.04, 447.06 of the Florida
Statutes (providing for the qualification and licensing of union business agents) were
held in conflict with the federal law (Wagner Act) and thus void.
119. It should also be noted that the Florida Constitution, Declaration of Rights,
Section 13, provides as follows:
Every person may fully speak and write his sentiments on all subjects being
responsible for the abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain
or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press.
120. Miami Typographical Union v. Ormerod, 61 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1952); United
Ass'n of Journeyman v. Robertson, 44 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1950); Moore v. City Dry Cleaners,
41 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1949); Retail Clerk's Union v. Lerner Shops of Florida, 140 Fla.
865, 193 So. 529 (1940).
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by strong dicta' 21 indicated its reluctance to enjoin expressions of opinion
except in the most serious cases.
CONCLUSION
The Woolworth and Livingstone Shirt decisions, and possibly the
Peerless Plywood decision, represent a considerably overdue correction to
the attitude of the National Labor Relations Board and of the courts
towards the employer's constitutional right of free speech. Whereas union
conduct of the most reprehensible sort has frequently been condoned as
an exercise of free speech, 22 the employer's freedom to speak his mind
has been severely limited. 123  In spite of the strong efforts of Congress
to remove the restrictions on employer free speech, the Bonwit Teller
case, and the cases subsequently controlled by it, indicated that the resuscita-
tion of the First Amendment by the Taft-Hartley Act was to be short-lived.
It does appear, however, while the correct result may have been
reached in the Woolworth and Livingstone Shirt decisions, they were based
too much on legal technicalities and refinements, and that broader constitu-
tional principles should have been considered and enunciated. The right
of any individual (even an employer!) to speak his mind on his own
premises about a situation with which lie is intimately concerned (being
the potential object of union demands) seems to be a right which is
guaranteed in the body of American constitutional law, rather than by a
series of statutory interpretations.
A more practical reason for encouraging greater freedom of speech of
employers is the revolutionary change in the economic and legal status of
labor organizations during the past twenty years. In 1935 labor unions
were of inconsequential strength as compared to 1953.1'4 It might be
121. In Moore v. City Dry Cleaners, supra note 120, the court said (at page 873):
... we know of no lawful authority under which a court of equity may proceed
to enjoin a free discussion of the facts surrounding such labor difficulty, even
though the things said may prove to be unfavorable to the industrial or business
establishment toward which the statements are directed .... In the absence
of an express situation plainly requiring reasonable public regulation in the
interest of human life and safety, the right [§ 13 FLA. CONST. D.R.] may not
be denied or abridged.
122. Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943); Bakery &
Pastry Drivers Union v. Woh, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321
(1941); \Vhitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Washington ex rel. Lumber
and Sawmill Workers v. Superior Court, 24 Wash.2d 314, 164 P.2d 662 (1945); Ted
It. Cooper Co., Inc. v. Los Angeles Building Trades Council, 3 CCH Lab. Cas.
60235 (Cal. 1941). See Jones, Picketing and the Communication of Ideas, 2 U.C.L.A.
L. Riv. 212 (1955); Note, 4 Burr. L. REv. 232 (1955).
123. See notes 19 and 20 suPra. See also, Mittenthal, Employer Speech-A Life
Cycle, 5 La. L.J. 101 (1954); Wirtz, The New N.L.R.B.; Herein of Employer Persuasion,
49 Nw. U.L. REv. 594 (1954); Koretz-Barta, Employer Free Speech under the Taft-
Hartley Act, 6 SYRAcusE L. Riv. 82 (1954); Note, 38 VA. L. REv. 1037 (1950).
The N.L.R.B. under Republican Administration, 55 COL. L. REv. 852, 882 (1955).
124. Total union membership in the United States in the year 1935 was 3,900,000,
representing 7.7% of the nation's total working force, The corresponding figures for
1953 were 16,500,000 and 25.2%. See BLoo.i AND NORTHrP, EcoNoMIcs
OF LABOR RELATIoNs 23 (1st ed. 1954).
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argued, with some degree of merit, that during the growth of labor unions
(at a time when the country was in the throes of an economic depression)
they should have been afforded a high degree of protection as against well-
established and financially secure employers. 125 Today, however, even the
smallest of the two nationally-known unions has net assets many times in
excess of those of most American corporations, 2 C, and the need for pro-
tection seems to have been reversed.
An even more practical reason for the renunciation of the Bonwit
Teller doctrine might be discerned by asking the following question, namely,
just how much are employees influenced by the statements, speeches,
leaflets, and so forth, of the employer? It has been the writer's experi-
ence 2 7 that most employees arc extremely skeptical when they listen to
the "boss's" views, and nine times out of ten will arbitrarily refuse to
believe even the most truthful and sincere statements he may make.
Furthermore, the employees are sophisticated enough to know that, even
though no threats are made by the employer, that union membership auto-
matically places them "on the other side of the fence" from management
and that the employer will look elsewhere when considering promotions.
In review, it appears that the National Labor Relations Board, as well
as the courts, have vacillated back and forth so many times on the issue
of employer free speech that it seems quite impossible to anticipate what
the next ruling will be. Perhaps a Supreme Court decision in the near
future Will settle this conflict in the existing case law, though it seems
unlikely that in so doing it will rely on the reasoning herein expressed. 28
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125. Actually the statistics on business failures during the depression ycars indicate
questionable financial security.
126. In 1949, the American Federation (f Labor, and its affiliates, possessed net
assets of approximately $176,000,000.00. See, What American Labor Unions are
Worth in Dollars and Cents, Business Week, Nov. 19, 1949, pp. 115-120. This article
includes a detailed table, compiled from official sources, showing the membership and
net assets of individual locals and affiliates. The total net assets of all American labor
unions were in excess of $1,000,000,000.00. It is significant that these assets were
held in a highly liquid form (when compared to the net assets of an industrial or
manufacturing corporation) and would place the unions at a considerable advantage
while waging their economic warfare.
127. Vhile working as a non-union machinist.
128. The efforts of Congress to amend and clarify the Taft-tlartley Act in its
provisions governing employer and employee free speech died in committee, when on
May 7, 1954, the Senate voted 50 to -12 to recommit the Administration's bill to the
Labor Committcc. See. Proceedings of the Section of Labor Relations Law, American
Bar Association, page 77 (August, 1954); Peck, Proposed Revisions of the Taft-Hartley
Act, Lib. of Cong. Leg. Ref. Svc. p. 30 (1954).
